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(5.) If His Majesty's Government wish to put pressure on the Cantonese Government, the following measures are available to them :-
(a.) If compelled to act alone.—Interruption of the passage of troops across the Yangtse at the railway centres at Hankow and Nanking and elsewhere below Hankow; interruption of purely Chinese traffic on the Yangtse; seizure of the Cantonese fleet; and (if the consent of the Powers can be obtained) a blockade of the Yangtse and of the approaches to Canton. (This is subject to a favourable reply from the Naval Commander-in-Chief regarding the strength of the defences of the Yangtse at Kiangyin.)
(b.) If acting with other Powers.-The above, supplemented by a complete
blockade and the control of all river traffic on the Yangtse.
(6.) The attack of the Bogue Fort covering the approaches to Canton is not at present recommended, as it would involve the use of troops now at Hong Kong, but forming part of the Shanghai Defence Force.
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(7.) Any new commitment of our land forces in China should be avoided at this juncture.
(8.) The risk of trouble at Tientsin and Peking should be reduced by the measures proposed above. We do not at present recommend an increase in the British garrison at Tientsin, notwithstanding Sir Miles Lampson's request for an additional Battalion (Peking Telegrain No. 542). We consider that the Japanese should be mainly responsible for the protection of British interests there. The British Minister should withdraw the Legation and British interests from Peking, if threatened by forces beyond the power of the Legation guards to resist.
(9.) Broadly we recommend that the British should be the predominant partner on the Yangtse and in South China, and the Japanese in North China, the available forces of all co-operating Powers being placed at the disposal of the predominant partner.
(10.) At the present juncture we wish to repeat and emphasise the insistence we laid in previous Reports on the importance of international as opposed to separate British action in China, if by any means effective co-operation can be organised."
5. The Cabinet considered this Report at its meeting held on the 30th March (Cabinet 20 (27), Conclusion 2), and reached the following Conclusions:-
"(a.) To approve generally the Conclusions of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (Paper C.P. 110 (27) ).*
(b.) That the First Lord of the Admiralty should send a telegram to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, for communication also to the General Officer Commanding the Shanghai Defence Force, and to be repeated by the Naval Commander-in-Chief to Sir Miles Lampson, containing a summary of the Report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Conclusions in fullt (Paper C.P. 110 (27 )* and inviting Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt's views on the feasibility of the plans proposed as a means for putting pressure upon the Cantonese Government.
(c.) That, provided the Commander-in-Chief concurred, the Secretary of State should take such steps as might be necessary at Peking and the other capitals to secure the co-operation in these measures of the five Powers.
(d.) That if the Powers are unwilling to join in appropriate sanctions, the question of the action to be taken should be brought before the Cabinet for a fresh decision.
(e.) That, as regards Tientsin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should inform Sir Miles Lampson of the objections of the Chiefs of Staff to his proposal in telegram No. 542 that an additional battalion should be sent, and should take up with the Japanese Government the whole position in regard to the security of Peking and Tientsin.
(f.) That, as regards the British nationals in the Upper Yangtse, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should send a telegram to the British.
* Also C.I.D. Paper No. 784-B.
↑ (Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, who was consulted by the Secretary about this on the telephone, concurred in the desirability of this action )
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